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█ Abstract Over the last decade, integrated philosophical and neuroscientific studies of empathy have be-
en steadily growing, because of the pivotal role that empathy plays in social cognition and ethics, as well as 
in the understanding of human behavior both under physiological conditions and in the presence of men-
tal disorders. The umbrella concept of empathy embraces multi-faceted characteristics, including affecti-
ve and cognitive processes, such as so-called emotional contagion and concern and perspective-taking. In 
this paper, we review the state-of-the-art of knowledge about the neurobiology of empathy. Specifically, 
we examine studies regarding empathy for pain, emotional imitation and expression and their alterations 
in psychopathological conditions. We also consider studies on the theory of mind (ToM) and the mirror 
neuron system (MNS). Finally, we propose measures of brain resting state activity as a potential neurobio-
logical marker of proneness to be empathic. 
KEYWORDS: Empathy; Mirror Neurons; Theory of Mind; Mental Disorders; Psychopathy. 
 
█ Riassunto Correlati neurobiologici della disposizione all’empatia umana – Nell’ultimo decennio è cresciu-
to il numero delle indagini sull’empatia condotte integrando la prospettiva filosofica e quella neuroscienti-
fica, in ragione del ruolo cardine svolto dall’empatia nella cognizione sociale e nell’etica, come pure nella 
comprensione del comportamento umano dal punto di vista delle condizioni fisiologiche e in presenza di 
disturbi mentali. La nozione di empatia funge da ombrello concettuale sotto cui ricadono caratteristiche 
multiformi, compresi i processi affettivi e cognitivi, come il cosiddetto contagio emotivo e l’assunzione di 
ruolo e di prospettiva. In questo lavoro intendiamo offrire una rassegna dello stato dell’arte delle cono-
scenze sulla neurobiologia dell’empatia. In particolare prenderemo in esame gli studi che vertono 
sull’empatia per il dolore, l’imitazione emotiva e dell’espressione e le loro alterazioni in condizioni psico-
patologiche. Considereremo inoltre studi sulla teoria della mente (ToM) e sul sistema dei neuroni spec-
chio (MNS). In sede conclusiva intendiamo proporre delle misure dell’attività cerebrale in condizioni di 
riposo come potenziale marcatore neurobiologico della propensione a empatizzare. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Empatia; Neuroni specchio; Teoria della mente; Disturbi mentali; Psicopatia. 
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█ A brief introduction for a broad issue 
 
EMPATHY HAS MANY DIFFERENT DEFINI-
TIONS, which are related to its multi-faceted 
characteristics. In fact, under the umbrella 
concept of empathy one can consider a vari-
ety of distinct affective and cognitive proces-
ses: the feeling of caring for other people and 
desiring to help them (often defined as “emo-
tional concern”); emotional contagion, me-
aning the experience of emotions that match 
those of another individual; understanding 
what another person is thinking or feeling; 
feeling discomfort related to the observation 
of others’ suffering (often defined as “perso-
nal distress”) and the ability to portray on-
eself in the shoes of a fictional character (of-
ten defined as “fantasy”).1 
Several psychological scales have been 
adopted to measure the various aspects of 
empathy. Among them, the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI)2 tried to address the 
composite nature of empathy by including 
four dimensions: emphatic concern; perspec-
tive taking; personal distress and fantasy. 
While the last one does not seem to be so 
closely related to the experience of empathy 
as we typically define it, the other three di-
mensions are widely used and studied in the 
psychological assessment of empathy. 
Given these premises, is not surprising that 
empathy is of great interest not only in social 
psychology and in ethics, because it is one of 
the components in the human proneness to 
bond, but also in clinical psychology and psy-
chopathology, because it is considered that 
disturbances of empathic abilities are present 
in different mental disorders, including au-
tism, alexithymia, dementias, social anxiety 
and psychopathic personality disorder.3  
Over the last decade or so, studies of em-
pathy have generated a wide interest in neu-
roscience research because empathy has im-
plications relevant not only for neuroethics, 
but also for the affective neuroscience of 
physiological and pathological conditions. By 
combining modern neuroimaging methodo-
logies, such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), with sophisticated psycho-
logical paradigms, scientists now have an un-
precedented tool to dissect the neural corre-
lates of human behavior and emotion.4 The 
aim of the present review is to provide a cri-
tical examination of the existent knowledge 
on the neurobiology of empathy. In this sen-
se, we do not aim to provide a complete in-
ventory of the studies conducted, but rather 
a synthetic summary of research that may 
contribute to a neurobiological model of em-
pathy that is supported by data and not by 
mere speculations. 
 
█ Empathy in action: The study of empathic 
concern in studies on pain and emotional 
recognition 
 
One of the most used paradigms in rese-
arch on empathic concern is the study of em-
pathy for somebody else’s pain. This para-
digm is considered optimal for several 
reasons. First of all, brain mechanisms invol-
ved in the perception of pain are very well-
known. Pain perception has been decompo-
sed into its more basic components. The tha-
lamus and somatosensory cortex account for 
the physical representation of pain (localizati-
on, intensity, qualitative characteristics), while 
the limbic structures (including amygdala, insu-
la and anterior cingulate cortex) account for 
the emotional value of the nociceptive experi-
ence.5 Also, recognition of and empathy for 
someone else’s pain have been well-described in 
the literature.  
The most frequently used paradigms for 
studying empathy for pain involve exposure 
to pictures of subjects with pain expressions 
or of body parts with wounds.6 Despite the 
methodological differences among the proto-
cols, these studies have consistently high-
lighted that pain perception and pain obser-
vation both lead to neural responses in the 
same cerebral regions. Among these areas, 
the anterior cingulate cortex plays a relevant 
role. Anterior cingulate activity appears to be 
related to the subjective experience of pain.  
For instance, the discharge of this region 
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correlates with the level of subjective intensi-
ty of pain perception, but not with the physi-
cal intensity of the painful stimulation. In the 
pivotal study by Coghill and colleagues, sub-
jects were asked to rate their subjective per-
ception of a painful stimulation on a visual 
analogue scale. Despite the fact that the phy-
sical stimulation was the same for all the vo-
lunteers (a 49° Celsius degrees hot patch on 
their non-dominant ventral forearm), subjects 
rated their painful experiences on a wide 
spectrum of intensities, ranging from mildly to 
extremely painful. The most relevant diffe-
rence in brain activation was a higher dischar-
ge of the anterior cingulate in those subjects 
who reported a more painful experience.7  
Consistent results were obtained by Rain-
ville and colleagues, using a different experi-
mental approach.8 To evaluate the role of dif-
ferent cortical areas involved in pain percep-
tion, hypnotic suggestion was used to modu-
late the unpleasantness of a noxious stimulus 
(induced with hand immersion in ice-cold 
water), without changing the perceived in-
tensity. During hypnotic modulation of pain, 
neural activity within the anterior cingulate 
cortex, but not in the primary somatosensory 
cortex, changed as a function of the degree of 
unpleasantness.9 
Neural activation in the anterior cingulate 
cortex has also been consistently found 
during the perception of and empathy for 
pain in others. For instance, Singer and col-
leagues demonstrated a similar pattern of 
discharge in the anterior cingulate cortex of 
women both during direct pain stimulation 
and its observation: identical activity was re-
corded when subjects underwent a painful 
stimulation and when they saw the same pain 
conveyed to their beloved one.10 However, 
anterior cingulate cortex is activated not only 
by physical pain or its observation, but also 
during “emotional” and “social” pain, as well 
as in frustration.11  
Moreover, the role of the anterior cingu-
late in frustration and in social pain is even 
wider, due to its involvement in coping with 
emotionally hurtful situations. In a recent 
study by our group,12 subjects who had been 
exposed to imagined hurtful scenarios, were 
asked to forgive the offender or to meditate 
and plan revenge. As compared to the hurtful 
scenario, the imagination of a way to cope 
with the situation (both forgiving or not for-
giving) increased neural activity in the ante-
rior cingulate cortex.13  
Therefore, in line with the available litera-
ture, we consider the anterior cingulate 
cortex a relevant area in the empathy for 
pain, but we argue that more than being a 
mirror region (see below), this region may 
represent the neurobiological counterpart of 
the personal distress triggered by the recogni-
tion of others’ suffering. 
Empathy for pain also appears to recruit 
other regions involved in emotional proces-
sing, in general, and in the emotional evalua-
tion of pain, in particular.14 It is crucial to 
underline that one’s own pain perception and 
the perception of someone else’s pain shared 
several brain area activations. However, it 
must be noted that a distinctive network of 
areas is active during our own pain percepti-
on and is not recruited during observation of 
pain in others. This network includes portions 
of the anterior cingulate and of the anterior in-
sula, the posterior insula and the somatosenso-
ry cortex.15 These differences between the per-
ception of pain in oneself and in others are cru-
cial since they represent, at the neurobiological 
level, our ability to discriminate between self 
and other experiences. 
Although pain perception is a very power-
ful stimulus for studying the neural mecha-
nisms of empathy, other emotional stimuli 
have been used as well, and this is important 
for the validation of results. We highlighted 
above how perceiving pain in others activates 
a network of brain areas that widely overlaps 
with those involved in the perception of o-
ne’s own pain. Can this finding be extended 
to other emotions? 
As a matter of fact, a similar overlap 
between the feeling of an emotion and its ob-
servation has been shown. For instance, it 
has been shown how specific areas within the 
Neurobiological Correlates of the Attitude Toward Human Empathy 
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anterior insula respond similarly both while 
subjects are experiencing disgust and when 
they are watching somebody else experien-
cing the same emotion.16  
As also pointed out in the case of pain, 
however, self-perception of disgust and recog-
nition of disgust in others’ faces result also in 
distinct brain activations. In fact, while activa-
tion in the insula is shared in the two conditi-
ons, the authors also found that being dis-
gusted activated a wider part of the anterior 
insula, while recognizing disgust in somebody 
else activated visual and dorsal prefrontal cor-
tical areas. 
Consequently, the available literature sug-
gests that empathy for a given emotion requi-
res the recruitment of brain areas that include 
but are not limited to those involved in the 
subjective experience of the same emotion. 
 
█ Understanding Intentions: The “Theory of 
Mind” Brain System 
 
In the previous section, we considered the 
neurobiological underpinnings of empathic 
concern. In the present and in the next ones, 
we will describe the role of other neural sys-
tems, which are supposed to be involved in 
the perspective-taking component of em-
pathy, namely, the theory of mind (ToM) 
network and the mirror neuron system 
(MNS). Although, as stated before, perspecti-
ve-taking, personal distress and empathic con-
cern are three separate dimensions, it makes 
sense to hypothesize that in order to develop 
empathic concern, one needs to understand 
other’s behaviors, intentions and feelings. 
The term “Theory of Mind” was intro-
duced by Premack and Woodruff  in 1978. 
Often used as a synonym for mentalizing, 
ToM is defined as the ability to understand 
mental states, including beliefs, intents, desi-
res and knowledge, to attribute such mental 
states to oneself and/or others and to under-
stand that others have mental states that may 
differ from one’s own.17 In fact, having a 
ToM seems a necessary prerequisite not only 
for being empathic, but also for developing 
any social cognition ability.  
The identification of the neurobiological 
underpinnings of ToM is very complex: ToM 
includes several features and abilities with 
distinct neural representations. In a seminal 
review of the literature, Frith and Frith18 
identified three ToM areas: temporal poles, 
posterior temporal sulcus and middle 
prefrontal cortex. Each of these areas seem to 
be specialized for some of the abilities com-
prised in the concept of ToM, for instance 
middle prefrontal cortex activity may be rela-
ted to the ability to distinguish mental from 
physical state representations. However, the 
activation of these components in concert 
appears to be critical to mentalizing and 
therefore activity in each of these regions is 
often shared across different ToM tasks.19  
The problem is that ToM is a compact and 
parsimonious definition which gathers under 
the same umbrella everything that is involved 
in social cognition and understanding but in-
cludes a larger set of abilities than one realizes 
at a first glance. In our opinion, this contribu-
tes to explaining why, only a few years after 
the work by Frith and Frith, a new review of 
the literature pointed out that over twelve re-
gions are recruited during ToM tasks.20 
Therefore, more than a single ability, ToM 
seems to include a series of mind faculties with 
the same general scope. With regard to its 
neural correlates, ToM tasks present patterns 
of brain activation which are in part shared 
across different mental faculties and in part 
are distinctive for each one. Empathy, and 
more precisely the perspective-taking compo-
nent of empathy, has been considered one of 
these faculties. In the review cited above, only 
one study focused on empathy.21 
The comparative analysis of the neuronal 
pattern obtained in this study with those from 
the other studies included in the review, once 
more highlighted that several ToM regions are 
active during almost all the ToM tasks, while a 
certain degree of specialization in single areas 
for perspective-taking emerged as well: alt-
hough not distinctive, precuneus/posterior 
cingulate gyrus and the cerebellum seemed to 
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be more specifically recruited during empathic 
perspective-taking. The neural response in 
precuneus/posterior cingulate is of particular 
interest, since this region seems to be related to 
the ability to switch the attention from inner 
thoughts and sensations to the external world 
and others.22  
Consequently, we can hypothesize that in 
order to understand someone else’s thoughts 
and eventually engage in empathic feelings, it is 
necessary to reduce one’s own self-focused at-
tention and redirect own cognitive resources 
toward others. 
  
█ Is empathy for others looking at oneself 
in the mirror? 
 
In the last decade, the role of the mirror 
neuron system (MNS) in empathy has stirred 
up a lot of interest. The MNS has been defi-
ned as a group of regions where neurons 
discharge in an identical way both while an 
individual performs an action and while they 
observe the same action being performed by 
somebody else.23 Initially discovered in the 
monkey,24 later fMRI studies identified a si-
milar mirror system in humans as well.25 
Furthermore, a study by our group showed 
that the mirror neuron system develops and 
functions also in the absence of any visual ex-
perience, for instance, in congenitally blind 
individuals, underscoring the relevance of this 
system from an evolutionary perspective.26  
Scientists have claimed that the mirror 
neuron system may explain imitation and 
mimicry both in primates and humans27 and 
be involved in learning from imitation28 as 
well as in social interaction.29 Based on this 
evidence, it was proposed that MNS may be 
the neurobiological underpinning of the 
association between mimicry and imitation 
on one side and empathy on the other.30 A 
fundamental element in this link is the con-
cept of emotional contagion.  
Emotional contagion is not only mediated 
by imitation and mirror-like phenomena, but 
also involves the diffusion of an emotion 
from one individual to another (which is part 
of the properties of the above-mentioned 
concepts of emotional contagion, empathic 
concern and of affective empathy).31 The 
MNS would therefore trigger emotional con-
tagion through imitation. 
One of the most valid paradigms for stu-
dying emotional contagion is yawning. Yaw-
ning can be observed in different species with 
(affective) empathic abilities;32 although yaw-
ning is a reflex stereotype motor action, its 
contagion seems to be modulated by emotio-
nal and social bonding (i.e., the contagion is 
more frequent when two individuals are bon-
ded).33 Finally, some studies highlighted how 
yawning observation and imitation activates 
the MNS,34 although contrasting results exist 
and others researches failed to find a specific 
recruitment of this system in yawning.35 
Despite the relatively inconsistent evi-
dence for  a relationships between yawing, 
mirror neurons and empathy, the relationship 
between empathy and imitation is strong and 
sustained by several other works, showing for 
instance how a higher ability to imitate facial 
expression is correlated to empathy.36 
According to Ferrari, mirror neurons may 
be involved in empathy and in emotional 
contagion in two possible ways.37 The first 
way implies a very strong and fundamental 
participation of the MNS: since these neu-
rons discharge in an identical way while per-
forming or while observing an action, their 
activity alone would be enough to evoke the 
emotional contagion reaction. In our opini-
on, this hypothesis, although intriguing, is 
insufficiently supported and even contradic-
ted by the data. In fact, suggesting that the 
mirror neurons themselves are responsible 
for empathic emotional contagion is in con-
flict with several observations. Despite the 
fact that mirror neurons “do not make a dif-
ference” between observation and execution 
of an action, the emotions evoked by empa-
thic contagion are not exactly identical to the 
ones experienced by the individual with 
whom one empathizes. Moreover, action 
recognition and emotional contagion can be 
independent: one can still be able to recogni-
Neurobiological Correlates of the Attitude Toward Human Empathy 
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ze an action or a feeling in someone else’s 
face without undergoing the contagion.  
As ingeniously exemplified by Aragon and 
colleagues:  
 
How could a boxer mirror a losing oppo-
nent’s expressions of fatigue, feeling his 
weariness, precisely when strength is re-
quired?38  
 
The necessity to this disconnection brings 
about, in our opinion, the necessity that the 
MNS in itself is not what generates empathy 
and empathic contagion. 
However, an alternative possibility exists: 
in the other hypothesis proposed by Ferrari, 
mirror neurons, while creating a neural code 
for the observed action and producing its si-
mulated copy, would also interact with the 
limbic system and other emotional brain 
areas. Such a communication would eventu-
ally trigger the emotional reaction.39 This hy-
pothesis seems to be more corroborated by 
empirical research. Several fMRI studies have 
shown that during both observation and imi-
tation of emotional facial expressions, regi-
ons not belonging to the MNS display increa-
sed activations.40 For instance, Van der Gaag 
and colleagues showed an increased activity 
in the insular cortex, anterior cingulate and 
amygdala during both observation and imita-
tion of emotional faces.41  
Therefore, either these regions have mir-
ror properties (an assertion for which an em-
pirical basis is still lacking) or their activity is 
triggered by the brain representations of the 
emotional face created also through the acti-
vation of the MNS.42 Interestingly, signifi-
cant correlations have also been shown 
between the activity of both the MNS and 
emotional areas and measures not just of 
empathy, but also of interpersonal abilities.43 
This indicates that recognizing and imitating 
emotional faces are in strict relationship not 
only with empathic abilities, but also with 
social cognition skills. In this sense social 
cognition may represent the necessary ante-
cedent on which empathy can develop. 
To conclude, we agree with a recent criti-
cal review of the literature evaluating the re-
lationships among empathy, imitation and 
MNS which stated that:  
 
MNS are deeply involved in empathy but 
given the various forms of imitation, en-
compassing emotional and non-emotional, 
automatic, and voluntary actions such a re-
lationship may vary. Moreover, these diffe-
rent forms of imitation may involve the 
MNS to different extents.44 
 
█ When empathy is missing: The study of 
psychopathology to understand empathy 
 
A widely used approach to understand 
empathy and its biological bases is through 
the study of those psychopathological disor-
ders characterized by altered empathic abili-
ties, from a subtle reduction of these skills all 
the way to their complete lack. Among psy-
chopathological models, the one that seems 
best suited for this purpose is Psychopathic 
Personality.  
Psychopathy is in fact a personality disorder 
characterized by lack of empathy and of guilt, 
superficial affect, manipulation of other people, 
and severe, premeditated and violent antisocial 
behavior.45 Callous, unemotional and detached 
personality traits observed in adolescents and 
children (the so-called callous-unemotional 
personality) are also considered as antecedents 
or risk factors for the development of psycho-
pathic personality in adulthood.46 
From a behavioral point of view, lack of 
empathy in these individuals has been studied 
in many different ways, providing scientific 
support to early clinical observations. For in-
stance, it was shown that psychopathic subjects 
have a reduced ability to recognize emotional 
expressions. More precisely, recognition of 
fearful, sad, and happy expressions is reduced, 
while disgusted and angry expressions are nor-
mally detected47 (for a detailed summary of the 
other cognitive, emotional and behavioral alte-
rations reported in this condition please refer 
to a recent narrative review by Blair).48 
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Neurobiological alterations were shown 
as well, both at a structural-morphological 
and a functional brain level. Studies on mor-
phological abnormalities consistently pointed 
out a reduced volume of the two amygdalae 
in individuals with psychopathic traits.49 The 
severity of psychopathic traits were also cor-
related with the severity of grey matter loss.50 
Functional data also supported the im-
portance of amygdala alterations in psycho-
pathic subjects during empathic situations.  
For instance, Glenn and colleagues found 
reduced amygdala activity while psychopa-
thic subjects coped with moral judgments.51 
Reduction in amygdala responses were 
shown during several other types of tasks in-
volving empathy, which include face percep-
tion and the perception of others’ pain, both 
in psychopathic subjects and in adolescent 
with callous-unemotional traits.52  
As a matter of fact, pain perception de-
serves a more extended consideration in this 
review, since it has been widely used as an 
experimental paradigm to study empathy in 
psychopaths. In adolescents, reduced activati-
on in amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex 
correlates with psychopathic traits as mea-
sured by clinical rating scales.53 These results 
are strongly consistent across studies.  
For instance, in another study on adole-
scents with callous traits, the perception of 
others’ pain evoked reduced brain activity (as 
compared to not-callous adolescents) in bila-
teral anterior insula, anterior cingulate 
cortex, and inferior frontal gyrus, regions 
associated with empathy for pain in previous 
studies (see below).54 Therefore, studies on 
empathy for pain in psychopathic individuals 
confirm results from those conducted with 
healthy individuals and suggest that similar 
regions are involved in perceiving our own 
pain and others’ suffering. 
Finally, it is also interesting to note that 
the Default Mode Network (DMN) is altered 
in individuals with psychopathic traits.55 The 
DMN is a group of regions that show higher 
activity during resting states and internally, 
as opposed to externally, directed mental ac-
tivity. The DMN remains more active in psy-
chopaths during an externally directed task, 
namely a Go-no Go task, suggesting that fai-
lure to properly deactivate this network may 
be a characteristic of these personality altera-
tions. Particularly, the posteromedial cortical 
region of the DMN seems to be specifically 
affected, as suggested also by a multiple re-
gression analysis, showing how the changes 
in brain activity of this region, during the 
Go-no Go task, were associated with psy-
chopathic traits.56 
Another psychopathological condition 
that seems to be correlated with a lack of 
empathy is alexithymia. Alexithymic patients 
are unable to display emotions, to describe, 
recognize and label them. As a matter of fact, 
lack of empathy, in this condition, may be 
related to a primary difficulty in under-
standing their own emotions. In this sense, 
the lack of what we would call semantic cate-
gories, may also prevent these individuals 
from recognizing emotions in others. A few 
studies evaluated empathic alterations in ale-
xithymic patients, though their results are 
not completely consistent. In particular, pati-
ents with alexithymia show reduced activity 
in regions related to empathic process. For 
instance, reduced activity in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex while 
processing others’ pain has been found.57  
Furthermore, a reduced response in the 
amygdala has been found in alexithymic pa-
tients also while they watched emotional 
faces. This reduction was also statistically cor-
related with the severity of their alexithymia 
as measured by clinical rating scales.58 These 
reduced activations can be considered related 
to the alterations of the cognitive components 
of the emotional processing, particularly the 
executive and regulatory aspects.  
The last psychopathological example of 
altered empathic ability is the one involving 
disorders of the autistic spectrum. Autism is 
not a unique clinical entity and the autistic 
spectrum also includes, for instance, conditi-
ons characterized by mild to severe mental 
retardation.59 Therefore, since patients with 
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autistic spectrum disorders not only have 
empathic deficits, but also cognitive, intellec-
tive and behavioral alterations, trying to de-
fine whether an altered brain response is in 
fact related to a given, distinctive clinical 
manifestation – in our case impaired empa-
thic skills – exposes us to a high risk of over-
simplification.  
As such, the lack of empathy in these pa-
tients should be considered not as a detached 
condition but in the framework of the gene-
ral pattern of alterations. For instance, it is 
well-known that one of the most common 
alterations in autism is the lack of ability to 
understand others’ facial expressions.60 This 
deficit is often related to altered ToM and 
perspective-taking mechanisms. However, it 
is well-known that these patients also show 
alterations in early face perception mecha-
nisms, including an abnormal response in the 
face-selective fusiform gyrus and an altered 
eye scan-path while exploring picture of 
faces, as demonstrated with the use of eye-
tracking techniques which can follow gaze 
movements and fixations.61  
Thus, the alterations in face emotional 
perception and response may be explained, at 
least in part, by some more basic perceptual 
abnormalities. If this is true, autistic patients 
may not be capable of emotional recognition 
primarily because they are capable of gathe-
ring only incomplete, biased or incorrect in-
formation about faces.  
In line with this hypothesis, some studies 
do not support the view that altered ToM 
mechanisms play a role in reduced empathic 
abilities in autistic patients. For instance, Pe-
terson showed that children with autism we-
re less empathic, according to their teachers, 
than normal children. However, ToM com-
petencies were unrelated to the alterations in 
empathic abilities.62 In this study autistic 
children and normally developed ones were 
evaluated using a test for ToM abilities (par-
ticularly the false beliefs test). Moreover 
school teachers assessed their empathic be-
havior on a scale from 0 (complete lack of 
empathy) to 5 (almost always empathic). 
Although autistic children had lower ToM 
and empathic scores as compared to normal-
ly developed children there was no signifi-
cant statistical correlation between ToM and 
empathic ability impairments. On the 
contrary, a relationship between ToM and 
empathy was found in normally developed 
controls.63 
Given these fundamental premises, a few 
studies have tried to evaluate the neurobiologi-
cal counterparts of the altered social skills 
found in autistic patients.64  As far as empathic 
concern for pain is concerned, a recent study 
failed to identify differences in autistic patients 
as compared to controls. Autistic patients and 
controls showed overlapping neural activity in 
several areas involved in pain perception and 
emotional reaction (including amygdala, or-
bitofrontal cortex, insula and anterior cingulate 
cortex) while looking at painful faces as com-
pared to non-painful ones.  
The only difference was that the score of 
empathic concern as measured by the Empa-
thic Quotient questionnaire predicted the 
magnitude of the activations in patients but 
not in controls. This suggests a subtle diffe-
rence in the neurobiology of the pain empa-
thic concern, but not a deficit as previously 
sustained.65 Nonetheless, other studies did 
not provide consistent findings. For instance, 
Fan and colleagues were able to highlight dif-
ferences in autistic patients as compared to 
healthy controls while viewing body parts 
being accidentally injured or a person inten-
tionally hurting another.  
In the first case, autistic patients recruited 
significantly more somatosensory cortex, but 
showed less activity in the anterior mid-
cingulate and anterior insula. In the second 
case, a reduced neural response in the medial 
prefrontal cortex was observed in the patient 
group. The authors suggested that autistic 
patients exhibited heightened empathic 
arousal, but impaired social understanding 
when perceiving others’ distress.66 In another 
study on moral reasoning, autistic patients 
showed decreased activity in amygdala and 
other limbic regions, as well as increased ac-
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tivation in the anterior and posterior cingula-
te gyri. The reduced activity may be related 
to a decrease in empathic abilities, while the 
hyper-activations of anterior and posterior 
cingulates – regions that also belong to the 
DMN – were explained in terms of biased 
social information processing.67 
Empathy in autistic patients was also eva-
luated with tasks based on face perception, in 
which patients and controls were instructed 
either to evaluate the emotional state obser-
ved in a face or to identify their own emotio-
nal response to that face. Despite the lack of 
differences in behavioral performance, diffe-
rent pattern of activations were highlighted 
between the two groups.  
For instance, autistic patients activated the 
dorsal middle prefrontal cortex while controls 
activated the ventral prefrontal cortex. More-
over, during the identification of their own 
emotional response, autistic subjects activated 
additional frontal and inferior temporal areas 
that were not recruited in the control group. 
On the other hand, both groups showed areas 
(specifically, the subgenual anterior cingulate 
cortex and the precuneus, both belonging to 
the DMN) in which the brain response during 
the task was parametrically correlated with 
empathic scores, as measured by the Empathic 
Questionnaire.68 Such differential patterns of 
activation may suggest that patients used dif-
ferent strategies to identify their emotional 
response to others’ emotions and to evaluate 
others’ face expressions. 
It is interesting to note that the cited stu-
dies did not find any specific alterations 
within the mirror neuron system of autistic 
as compared to healthy individuals. While 
there are several possible explanations for 
this lack of differences, the most relevant in 
our opinion is the fact that, at least to our 
knowledge, no study has specifically assessed 
the role of the MNS in relation to empathic 
alterations in autistic patients.  
As a matter of fact, several studies in au-
tistic patients showed alterations in the mir-
ror neuron system during observati-
on/imitation tasks that did not involve em-
pathy. For instance, during action observati-
on and imitation, autistic patients showed 
reduced activity in the MNS (namely, the in-
ferior parietal lobule) and in ToM areas (in-
cluding the temporo-parietal junction).69 
Therefore, these results supported the idea 
that altered MNS may be responsible for dys-
function in social cognition. In particular, the 
so-called “broken mirror” hypothesis sugges-
ted that altered mirror neuron system activi-
ty might be responsible for a self-other mat-
ching impairment, altering the Embodied 
Cognition of this type of patients.70  
However, the broken mirror hypothesis was 
recently criticized, by maintaining that alterati-
ons in the MNS were not responsible for the 
alteration of embodied cognition and social ski-
lls in autism.71 In this sense, as previously 
stated, the MNS may be more strictly related to 
the basic function of recognizing and giving 
sense to others’ actions that may eventually 
trigger also an emotional/empa-thic/reaction.72  
Future studies, therefore, should not only 
clarify to what extent this system is altered in 
autistic spectrum disorders, but also whether 
this alteration is directly linked to alterations 
in empathy in these patients or rather if it af-
fects some more basic function which, in 
turn, may be relevant for empathic reaction. 
Finally, in autistic spectrum disorders, 
resting state activity was also examined in se-
arch of alterations that may be related to dys-
functional empathic abilities. In a study on 
global functional resting state connectivity, 
participants with autism showed a complex 
pattern of alterations.73 Specifically, increa-
sed connectivity was detected between mir-
ror neuron system areas and ToM areas. This 
increased connectivity was positively correla-
ted with difficulties in social cognition and 
communication.74 
 
█ Would one be empathic in the desert? 
Resting state activity and empathy as a 
trait psychological characteristic 
 
In the previous section, we reported how 
alterations in the DMN and resting state activi-
Neurobiological Correlates of the Attitude Toward Human Empathy 
 
79 
ty may be among the neurobiological correlates 
of psychopathic personality or alterations of 
empathic abilities in patients with autism. Such 
results may have implications that are deeper 
than one can get at the first glance. In particu-
lar, an alteration of the DMN may mean that 
the baseline spontaneous activity of the brain 
could also be affected by psychopathological 
traits, that is, the alterations seen during an 
emotional or empathic task are already present 
in the resting brain.  
Thus, if psychopathic and autistic brains 
have a different morphological and functional 
architecture than healthy brains, they may res-
pond differently to empathic triggering situa-
tions because of a different information proces-
sing system. Can we extend such an idea to 
normal personality traits? Is it an empathic 
brain someway different from a less empathic 
one in the absence of any stimulus? 
It is undoubtedly true that empathy rises as 
a behavior or a thought in the presence of a si-
tuation in which we have to consider others. 
Compassion, understanding and even pity can-
not exist without an object. However, the pro-
neness to be more or less empathic, to under-
stand better or worse others’ feelings or their 
intentions and states of mind, represents a trait 
characteristic, like all the other personality 
traits. Specifically, a trait characteristic is clearly 
related to the predictability and the reproduci-
bility of our behavior. For instance, a shy per-
son will be consistently shy within different 
contexts. In the same way, a person with high 
levels of empathic concern will constantly show 
greater participation in the feelings of mean-
ingful others.  
To put it differently, an empathic person 
will be empathic under the most diverse situa-
tions. In this sense, cognitive psychology has 
hypothesized that the way in which we react to 
a given situation largely depends on the state of 
mind that precedes that situation. The idea that 
how we cope with situations is deeply in-
fluenced by our “mind disposition” is indeed an 
old one:75 from Plato to William James and 
cognitive psychology. In this sense, the way in 
which we react to relevant situations, which 
may trigger empathy, is somewhat determined 
a priori and derives from our personality and 
psychological characteristics. 
According to cognitive models, therefore, 
the development of the empathic reaction is 
also related to information processing. If 
empathy is a state of the mind, a trait charac-
teristic of our personality, it is plausible that 
neural activity would be modulated by its 
degree, not only when individuals are expo-
sed to engaging situations, but also at rest. An 
empathic mind is such because it is shaped in 
advance to process information and react 
emphatically. Over the last decade, these 
considerations, among many others, have 
prompted the study of resting-state brain ac-
tivity and its correlations with defined psy-
chological or psychopathological traits.  
As compared to activation studies, how-
ever, resting-state studies present a different 
difficulty – the fact that there are different 
ways to measure and to assess neuronal fMRI 
signal. This is not a trivial issue since each 
method conveys different, often complemen-
tary, information on spontaneous brain acti-
vity. For instance, functional connectivity is 
supposed to provide a measure of the functi-
onal relationship among distinct brain regi-
ons, as an expression of the degree of cohe-
rence of their neural discharge. Other in-
dices, like the Hurst Exponent, are measures 
of complexity that reflect the mutual interac-
tion between segregated and integrated brain 
activity of a given region. The Hurst Expo-
nent, in particular, is an index that describes 
the predictability of a time series. The Hurst 
Exponent has a range between -1 and 1. The 
closer to the extremes the Hurst exponent is, 
the more the time-series is regular and pre-
dictable, namely, the past and long term dy-
namics have a stronger influence on future 
responses. On the other hand, a Hurst expo-
nent closer to 0.5 describes a chaotic and less 
predictable time-series. The Hurst Exponent 
of an fMRI time-series is increased in the 
hippocampus with aging but decreases with 
cholinergic transmission enhancement.76 
Nonetheless, this does not warrant the con-
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clusion that a higher Hurst Exponent is rela-
ted to a worsening in brain functioning. For 
instance, a reduction of HE has been obser-
ved in autistic and schizophrenic patients.77 
Therefore, it seems more plausible that the 
Hurst Exponent reflects some inherent pat-
tern of spontaneous discharge and that it can 
be modulated by psychological or psychopa-
thological variables. Furthermore, the Hurst 
Exponent has been linked to personality traits 
involving extraversion and impulsivity.78  
In a preliminary research from our labo-
ratory presented at the 2014 Annual Con-
gress of the Italian Society of Neuroethics,79 
we calculated the Hurst Exponent in twenty 
subjects with different degrees of emotional 
concern as measured by the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index and showed that emotional 
concern was related to the activity of emoti-
onally related regions (figure 1). In particu-
lar, we found that the Hurst Exponent in the 
amygdala was correlated with the score of 
this empathic dimension: the higher the 
emotional concern, the more predictable the 
neural discharge in the amygdala. Thus, it 
seems that a coordinated discharge of this 
structure is fundamental for entering in emo-
tional resonance with others. As the data we-
re acquired at rest, they may reflect the pre-
disposition, the proneness to react in an em-
phatic (or not empathic) way. 
 
 
Figure 1. Hurst exponent in the amygdala in-
creases with the increase of empathic concern 
measured by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, 
in a group of twenty healthy volunteers 
Other studies have tried to describe the 
relationship between brain resting state acti-
vity and empathy. Most of them were 
conducted using functional connectivity 
measures, the most widely used metric in 
resting state analysis. A recent review exa-
mined the role of the DMN in understanding 
others’ thoughts and emotions.80 Consis-
tently, these different studies showed that the 
medial prefrontal cortex may be involved in 
the social understanding of others. In parti-
cular, as far as empathy is concerned, the 
ventral portion of this cortical region, along 
with the medial temporal lobe, is mainly 
associated with emotional engagement 
during social interactions, while its dorsal 
part, through its connection with the tempo-
ro-parietal junction, is related to the under-
standing of mental states.81 These results 
confirm the hypothesis that the DMN plays a 
fundamental role in empathy and social cog-
nition, as clearly summarized by Mitchell 
who claimed that «when left to its own de-
vices, the human brain appears naturally to 
engage in social-cognitive thought».82 
 
█ Would one be  
 
In this review we discussed how a wides-
pread neural system supporting empathy is 
present in our brain. Although descriptive 
psychology has defined different forms of 
empathy, in neuroscience these distinctions 
have not been as sharply drawn. This makes 
a systematic review of the literature is more 
difficult, given that researchers most often 
refer generally to the neurobiological correla-
tes of empathy without making any distinc-
tion among emotional understanding, per-
spective-taking, emotional contagion and 
distress for others’ suffering. 
Regarding the emotional sharing and con-
tagion components of empathy, the literature 
has consistently pointed out that regions re-
lated to emotional perception and regulation, 
like the anterior cingulate cortex, insula and 
amygdala, seem to be recruited both during 
the subjective experience of a given emotion 
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and in the understanding and sharing others’ 
emotions. Due to the type of analysis and the 
limitations of the functional exploration of 
the brain techniques, which cannot image 
single neurons, it is not possible to under-
stand whether an identical pattern of neural 
discharge is involved in both inner emotional 
experience and in empathy. However, what 
can be said is that a large common recruit-
ment of these brain areas is present during 
both experiences.  
Of course, despite the commonalities, ex-
periencing an emotion and observing or 
being empathic with it also recruit specific 
and different brain areas. Empathy studies 
are not generally interested in these diffe-
rences, since they are more focused in asses-
sing commonalities between subjective emo-
tional experience and empathy. However, 
differences do count. Too focused on high-
lighting, showing and demonstrating that fee-
ling sorrow for others’ pain is just like experien-
cing our own, sometimes researchers seem to 
forget that if this were the case, we would not 
be able to distinguish ourselves from others: we 
would be in a condition where the boundaries 
of the self would be lacking, as happens in some 
psychotic conditions.83  
Also, understanding differences between 
feeling one’s own emotions and empathy for 
others’ emotions is the basis for the under-
standing of a third person perspective, which is 
fundamental in detaching from emotions 
which may otherwise become unbearable.84 De-
taching from emotions is a necessary operation, 
for instance, in the psychological and psychiat-
ric professions: being too absorbed by patients’ 
suffering may lead to negative effects, like emo-
tional exhaustion and burn-out.85  
As far as the perspective-taking dimensi-
on of empathy is concerned, several studies 
have shown that a wide and complex net-
work of areas is involved. Specifically, the 
ToM and mirror neuron networks were sys-
tematically evaluated. The ToM network has 
been extensively studied over the last years: 
its functional neuroanatomy now includes 
several different areas. Each area seems to 
serve distinct functions and abilities gathered 
under the umbrella definition of ToM.  
On the other hand, despite the increasing 
interest in the mirror neuron system, the fin-
dings that confirm a direct role of MNS in 
empathy and perspective-taking are rela-
tively weak. For both ToM and MNS we 
would suggest that rather than being the neu-
robiological counterparts of empathy, they 
are systems that may trigger affective em-
pathy. In particular, we believe that the two 
systems, allowing the interaction and the 
comprehension of others, may help to trigger 
emotional contagion and perspective ta-
cking, but they are not sufficient and may not 
even be necessary.  
It is interesting to note that emotional 
concern and perspective-taking are the two 
most studied dimensions of empathy. Despi-
te the fact that the multidimensional 
construct of empathy proposed by Davis86 
also included the personal distress and the 
fantasy scale, there is no concluding evidence 
on their neurobiological underpinnings.  
Finally, although the number of studies is 
still small, an interesting approach to stu-
dying empathy and, more generally, psycho-
logical dimensions, entails the study of brain 
resting state activity which could shed light 
on the processes that trigger the empathic 
reaction while we cope with others’ feelings. 
To summarize, the available literature on 
the neurobiology of empathy portrayed in 
this short narrative review suggests a few 
conclusive points that may be a base on 
which to develop future research: 
 
(a) Neurobiological research confirmed the 
position of descriptive psychology that 
empathy is not a unitary concept but 
rather a constellation of behaviors, 
thoughts and feelings consistently and 
constantly present when we deal with 
other human beings; 
 
(b) Since there is no evidence for a shared 
system for all of the forms of empathy 
defined, the very concept of empathy 
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and the possibility of defining its neuro-
biological underpinnings have to be 
reconsidered. We can no longer speak of 
this concept without specifying which 
definition, part or dimension we are re-
ferring to; 
 
(c) In line with this complexity, each dimen-
sion of empathy seems to be linked to a 
different neurobiological correlate; 
 
(d) The proposed distinction between cogni-
tive empathy and emotional empathy 
may also be traced at a neurobiological 
level. Specifically, the activity of the 
Theory of Mind network and the mirror 
neuron system may play a role in cogni-
tive empathy, while the limbic and pa-
ralimbic areas seem to play a role in emo-
tive empathy. 
 
To conclude, it is our opinion that recent 
achievements in cognitive neuroscience have 
provided a novel and deeper comprehension 
of how we interact, understand and eventual-
ly empathize with others. However, several 
aspects still remain to be dissected, including 
the neurobiological underpinnings of the dis-
tinct forms of empathy already described in 
clinical and behavioral research.  
Future research and theoretical speculati-
on should start from these consistent pieces 
of knowledge to develop a more inclusive 





1 See L. CHRISTOV-MOORE, E.A. SIMPSON, G. 
COUDÉ, K. GRIGAITYTE, M. IACOBONI, P.F. FER-
RARI, Empathy: Gender Effects in Brain and Beha-
vior, in: «Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Re-
views», vol. XLVI, Pt. 4, 2014, pp. 604-627; M. 
DAVIS, Measuring Individual Differences in Em-
pathy: Evidence for a Multidimensional Approach, 
in: «Journal of Personality and Social Psycholo-
gy», vol. XLIV, n. 1, 1983, pp. 113-126. 
2 See M. DAVIS, Measuring Individual Differences 
in Empathy, cit. 
 
 
3 See S. BAEZ, F. MANES, D. HUEPE, T. TORRALVA, 
N. FIORENTINO, F. RICHTER, D. HUEPE-ARTIGAS, 
J. FERRARI, P. MONTAÑES, P. REYES, D. MATALL-
ANA, N.S. VIGLIECCA, J. DECETY, A. IBANEZ, Pri-
mary Empathy Deficits in Frontotemporal Demen-
tia, in: «Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience», vol. 
X, n. 6, 2014, art. n. 262; M.E. BODDEN, D. KÜB-
LER, S. KNAKE, K. MENZLER, J.T. HEVERHAGEN, J. 
SOMMER, E. KALBE, S. KRACH, R. DODEL, Compa-
ring the Neural Correlates of Affective and Cogniti-
ve Theory of Mind Using fMRI: Involvement of the 
Basal Ganglia in Affective Theory of Mind, in: 
«Advances in Cognitive Psychology», vol. IX, n. 
1, 2013, pp. 32-43; D. BONS, E. VAN DEN BROEK, F. 
SCHEEPERS, P. HERPERS, N. ROMMELSE, J.K. BUI-
TELAAR, J.K. BUITELAAAR, Motor, Emotional, and 
Cognitive Empathy in Children and Adolescents 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder and Conduct Dis-
order, in: «Journal of Abnormal Child Psycholo-
gy», vol. XLI, n. 3, 2013, pp. 425-443. 
4 See P. PIETRINI, Toward a Biochemistry of 
Mind?, in: «American Journal of Psychiatry», 
vol. CLX, n. 11, 2003, pp. 1907-1908. 
5 See K.D. DAVIS, M. MOAYEDI, Central Mecha-
nisms of Pain Revealed Through Functional and 
Structural MRI, in: «Journal of Neuroimmune 
Pharmacology», vol. VIII, n. 3, 2013, pp. 518-
534. 
6 See C. LAMM, J. DECETY, T. SINGER, Meta-
analytic Evidence for Common and Distinct Neural 
Networks Associated with Directly Experienced 
Pain and Empathy for Pain, in: «NeuroImage», 
vol. LIV, n. 3, 2011, pp. 2492-2502. 
7 See R.C. COGHILL, J.G. MCHAFFIE, Y.-F. YEN, 
Neural Correlates of Interindividual Differences in 
the Subjective Experience of Pain, in: «Procee-
dings of National Academy of Science - U. S. A.», 
vol. C, n. 14, 2003, pp. 8538-8542. 
8 See P. RAINVILLE, G.H. DUNCAN, D.D. PRICE, B. 
CARRIER, M.C. BUSHNELL, Pain Affect Encoded in 
Human Anterior Cingulate but not Somatosensory 
Cortex, in: «Science», vol. CCLXXVII, n. 5328, 
1997, pp. 968-971. 
9 Ibidem. 
10 See T. SINGER, B. SEYMOUR, J.O’DOHERTY, H. 
KAUBE, R.J. DOLAN, C.D. FRITH, Empathy for 
Pain Involves the Affective but not Sensory Compo-
nents of Pain, in: «Science», vol. CCCIII, n. 5661, 
2004, pp. 1157-1162. 
11 See N.I. EISENBERGER, Meta-analytic Evidence 
for the Role of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex in 
Social Pain, in: «Social Cognitive and Affective 
 




Neuroscience», vol. X, n. 1, 2015, pp. 1-2. 
12 See E. RICCIARDI, G. ROTA, L. SANI, C. GENTILI, 
A. GAGLIANESE, M. GUAZZELLI, P. PIETRINI, How 
the Brain Heals Emotional Wounds: The Functional 
Neuroanatomy of Forgiveness, in: «Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience», vol. VII, 2013, art. n. 839. 
13 Ibidem. 
14 See C. LAMM, J. DECETY, T. SINGER, Meta-
analytic Evidence for Common and Distinct Neural 
Networks Associated with Directly Experienced 
Pain and Empathy for Pain, cit. 
15 Ibidem. 
16 See B. WICKER, C. KEYSERS, J. PLAILLY, J.P. 
ROYET, V. GALLESE, G. RIZZOLATTI, Both of us 
Disgusted in My Insula: The Common Neural Basis 
of Seeing and Feeling Disgust, in: «Neuron», vol. 
XL, n. 3, 2003, pp. 655-664. 
17 See D. PREMACK, G. WOODRUFF, Does the Chim-
panzee Have a Theory of Mind?, in: «Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences», vol. I, n. 4, 1978, pp. 515-526. 
18 See U. FRITH, C. D. FRITH, Development and Neu-
rophysiology of Mentalizing, in: «Philosophical 
Transactions of Royal Society. B. Biological Sci-
ences», vol. CCCLVIII, n. 1431, 2003, pp. 459-473. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 See S.J. CARRINGTON, A.J. BAILEY, Are There 
Theory of Mind Regions in the Brain? A Review of 
the Neuroimaging Literature, in: «Human Brain 
Mapping», vol. XXX, n. 8, 2009, pp. 2313-2335. 
21 See B.A. VÖLLM, A.N.W. TAYLOR, P. RICHARD-
SON, R. CORCORAN, J. STIRLING, S. MCKIE, J.F.W. 
DEAKIN, R. ELLIOTT, Neuronal Correlates of Theo-
ry of Mind and Empathy: A Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Study in a Nonverbal Task, in: 
«NeuroImage», vol. XXIX, n. 1, 2006, pp. 90-98. 
22 See C. GENTILI, E. RICCIARDI, M.I. GOBBINI, 
M.F. SANTARELLI, J.V. HAXBY, P. PIETRINI, M. 
GUAZZELLI, Beyond Amygdala: Default Mode 
Network Activity Differs Between Patients with 
Social Phobia and Healthy Controls, in: «Brain 
Research Bulletin», vol. LXXIX, n. 6, 2009, pp. 
409-413; F. SCHNEIDER, F. BERMPOHL, A. HEIN-
ZEL, M. ROTTE, M. WALTER, C. TEMPELMANN, C. 
WIEBKING, H. DOBROWOLNY, H.J. HEINZE, G. 
NORTHOFF, The Resting Brain and Our Self: Self-
relatedness Modulates Resting State Neural Activi-
ty in Cortical Midline Structures, in: «Neuro-
science», vol. CLVII, n. 1, 2008, pp. 120-131. 
23 See G. RIZZOLATTI, L. CRAIGHERO, The Mirror-
neuron System, in: «Annual Review of Neuro-
science», vol. XXVII, 2004, pp. 169-192. 
24 See G. RIZZOLATTI, L. FADIGA, V. GALLESE, L. 
 
 
FOGASSI, Premotor Cortex and the Recognition of 
Motor Actions, in: «Cognitive Brain Research», 
vol. III, n. 2, 1996, pp. 131-141. 
25 See G. BUCCINO, F. BINKOFSKI, G.R. FINK, L. 
FADIGA, L. FOGASSI, V. GALLESE, R.J. SEITZ, K. 
ZILLES, G. RIZZOLATTI, H.J. FREUND, Action Ob-
servation Activates Premotor and Parietal Areas in 
a Somatotopic Manner: An fMRI Study, in: «Eu-
ropean Journal of Neuroscience», vol. XIII, n. 2, 
2001, pp. 400-404. 
26 See E. RICCIARDI, D. BONINO, L. SANI, T. 
VECCHI, M. GUAZZELLI, J.V. HAXBY, L. FADIGA, P. 
PIETRINI, Do we Really Need Vision? How Blind 
People “See” the Actions of Others, in: «Journal of 
Neuroscience», vol. XXIX, n. 31, 2009, pp. 9719-
9724. 
27 See M. IACOBONI, Imitation, Empathy, and Mir-
ror Neurons, in: «Annual Review of Psychology», 
vol. LX, 2009, pp. 653-670. 
28 See C. CATMUR, Sensorimotor Learning and the 
Ontogeny of the Mirror Neuron System, in: «Neu-
roscience Letters», vol. DXL, 2013, pp. 21-27. 
29 See A.F. DE C. HAMILTON, The Mirror Neuron 
System Contributes to Social Responding, in: 
«Cortex», vol. XLIX, n. 10, 2013, pp. 2957-2959; 
S. KROGH-JESPERSEN, C. FILIPPI, A.L. WOODWARD, 
A Developmental Perspective on Action and Social 
Cognition, in: «Behavioral and Brain Science», vol. 
XXXVII, n. 2, 2014, pp. 208-209. 
30 See M. IACOBONI, Imitation, Empathy, and Mir-
ror Neurons, cit. 
31 See E. PALAGI, A. LEONE, G. MANCINI, P.F. FER-
RARI, Contagious Yawning in Gelada Baboons as a 
Possible Expression of Empathy, in: «Proceedings 
of National Academy of Science - U. S. A.», vol. 
CVI, n. 46, 2009, pp. 19262-19267. 
32 See I. NORSCIA, E. PALAGI, Yawn Contagion and 
Empathy in Homo Sapiens, in: «PloS ONE», vol. 
VI, n. 12, 2011, art. n. e28472. 
33 See E. PALAGI, A. LEONE, G. MANCINI, P.F. FER-
RARI, Contagious Yawning in Gelada Baboons as a 
Possible Expression of Empathy, cit. 
34 See H. HAKER, W. KAWOHL, U. HERWIG, W. 
RÖSSLER, Mirror Neuron Activity During Contagi-
ous Yawning - an fMRI Study, in: «Brain Imaging 
and Behavior», vol. VII, n. 1, 2013, pp. 28-34. 
35 See F.B. NAHAB, N. HATTORI, Z.S. SAAD, M. 
HALLETT, Contagious Yawning and the Frontal Lo-
be: An fMRI Study, in: «Human Brain Mapping», 
vol. XXX, n. 5, 2009, pp. 1744-1751; M. SCHÜR-
MANN, M.D. HESSE, K.E. STEPHAN, M. SAARELA, K. 
ZILLES, R. HARI, G.R. FINK, Yearning to Yawn: The 
 




Neural Basis of Contagious Yawning, in: «Neu-
roImage», vol. XXIV, n. 4, 2005, pp. 1260-1264. 
36 See M. IACOBONI, Imitation, Empathy, and Mir-
ror Neurons, cit.; J.H.G. WILLIAMS, A.T.A. NICOL-
SON, K.J. CLEPHAN, H. DE GRAUW, D.I. PERRETT, 
A Novel Method Testing the Ability to Imitate 
Composite Emotional Expressions Reveals an 
Association with Empathy, in: «PLoS ONE», vol. 
VIII, n. 4, 2013, art. n. e61941. 
37 See P.F. FERRARI, The Neuroscience of Social Re-
lations. A Comparative-based Approach to Em-
pathy and to the Capacity of Evaluating Others’ 
Action Value, in: «Behaviour», vol. CLI, n. 2-3, 
2014, pp. 297-313. 
38 See O.R. ARAGÓN, E.A. SHARER, J.A. BARGH, 
J.A. PINEDA, Modulations of Mirroring Activity by 
Desire for Social Connection and Relevance of Mo-
vement, in: «Social Cognitive and Affective Neu-
roscience», vol. IX, n. 11, 2014, pp. 1762-1769. 
39 See P.F. FERRARI, The Neuroscience of Social Re-
lation, cit. 
40 See C. VAN DER GAAG, R.B. MINDERAA, C. KEY-
SERS, Facial Expressions: What the Mirror Neuron 
System Can and Cannot Tell us, in: «Social Neuro-
science», vol. II, n. 3-4, 2007, pp. 179-222; L. 
BRAADBAART, H. DE GRAUW, D.I. PERRETT, G.D. 
WAITER, J.H.G. WILLIAMS, The Shared Neural Ba-
sis of Empathy and Facial Imitation Accuracy, in: 
«NeuroImage», vol. LXXXIV, 2014, pp. 367-375; 
J. H. PFEIFER, M. IACOBONI, J.C. MAZZIOTTA, M. 
DAPRETTO, Mirroring Others’ Emotions Relates to 
Empathy and Interpersonal Competence in Children, 
in: «NeuroImage», vol. XXIX, n. 4, 2008, pp. 
2076-2085; A.D. BAIRD, I.E. SCHEFFER, S.J. WIL-
SON, Mirror Neuron System Involvement in Em-
pathy: A Critical Look at the Evidence, in: «Social 
Neuroscience», vol. VI, n. 4, 2011, pp. 327-335. 
41 See C. VAN DER GAAG, R.B. MINDERAA, C. KEY-
SERS, Facial Expressions, cit. 
42 Ibidem. 
43 See L. BRAADBAART, H. DE GRAUW, D.I. PER-
RETT, G.D. WAITER, J.H.G. WILLIAMS, The 
Shared Neural Basis of Empathy and Facial Imita-
tion Accuracy, cit.; J.H. PFEIFER, M. IACOBONI, 
J.C. MAZZIOTTA, M. DAPRETTO, Mirroring 
Others’ Emotions Relates to Empathy and Interper-
sonal Competence in Children, cit. 
44 See A.D. BAIRD, I.E. SCHEFFER, S.J. WILSON, Mir-
ror Neuron System Involvement in Empathy, cit. 
45 See E. VIDING, E. MCCRORY, A. SEARA-
CARDOSO, Psychopathy, in: «Current Biology», 
vol. XXIV, n. 18, 2014, pp. R871-874. 
 
 
46 See E. VIDING, N.M.G. FONTAINE, E.J. MCCRO-
RY, Antisocial Behaviour in Children With and 
Without Callous-Unemotional Traits, in: «Journal 
of Royal Society of Medicine», vol. CV, n. 5, 
2012, pp. 195-200. 
47 See A. DAWEL, R. O’KEARNEY, E. MCKONE, R. 
PALERMO, Not Just Fear and Sadness: Meta-
analytic Evidence of Pervasive Emotion Recognition 
Deficits for Facial and Vocal Expressions in Psycho-
pathy, in: «Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Re-
views», vol. XXXVI, n. 10, 2012, pp. 2288-2304; 
A.A. MARSH, R.J.R. BLAIR, Deficits in Facial Affect 
Recognition Among Antisocial Populations: A meta-
analysis, in: «Neuroscience and Biobehavioral 
Reviews», vol. XXXII, n. 3, 2008, pp. 454-465. 
48 See R.J.R BLAIR, Psychopathy: Cognitive and 
Neural Dysfunction, in: «Dialogues in Clinical 
Neuroscience», vol. XV, n. 2, 2013, pp. 181-190. 
49 See Y. YANG, A. RAINE, K.L. NARR, P. COLLET-
TI, A.W. TOGA, Localization of Deformations 
Within the Amygdala in Individuals with Psycho-
pathy, in: «Archive of General Psychiatry», vol. 
LXVI, n. 9, 2009, pp. 986-994. 
50 See E. ERMER, L.M. COPE, P.K. NYALAKANTI, 
V.D. CALHOUN, K.A. KIEHL, Aberrant Paralimbic 
Gray Matter in Criminal Psychopathy, in: «Jour-
nal of Abnormal Psychology», vol. CXXI, n. 3, 
2012, pp. 649-658. 
51 See A.L. GLENN, A. RAINE, R.A. SCHUG, The 
Neural Correlates of Moral Decision-making in 
Psychopathy, in: «Molecular Psychiatry», vol. 
XIV, n. 1, 2009, pp. 5-6. 
52 See A.P. JONES, K.R. LAURENS, C.M. HERBA, G.J. 
BARKER, E. VIDING, Amygdala Hypoactivity to 
Fearful Faces in Boys With Conduct Problems and 
Callous-unemotional Traits, in: «American Jour-
nal of Psychiatry», vol. CLXVI, n. 1, 2009, pp. 95-
102; A.A. MARSH, E.C. FINGER, K.A. FOWLER, C.J. 
ADALIO, I.T.N. JURKOWITZ, J.C. SCHECHTER, D.S. 
PINE, J. DECETY, R.J.R. BLAIR, Empathic Responsi-
veness in Amygdala and Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
in Youths With Psychopathic Traits, in: «Journal 
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry», vol. LIV, n. 
8, 2013, pp. 900-910. 
53 See A.A. MARSH, E.C. FINGER, K.A. FOWLER, 
C.J. ADALIO, I.T.N. JURKOWITZ, J.C. SCHECHTER, 
D.S. PINE, J. DECETY, R.J.R. BLAIR, Empathic 
Responsiveness in Amygdala and Anterior Cingula-
te Cortex in Youths With Psychopathic Traits, cit. 
54 See P.L. LOCKWOOD, C.L. SEBASTIAN, E.J. 
MCCRORY, Z.H. HYDE, X. GU, SA. DE BRITO, E. 
VIDING, Association of Callous Traits With Re-
 




duced Neural Response to Others’ Pain in Children 
With Conduct Problems, in: «Current Biology», 
vol. XXIII, n. 10, 2013, pp. 901-905. 
55 See S.M. FREEMAN, D.V. CLEWETT, C.M. BEN-
NETT, K.A. KIEHL, M.S. GAZZANIGA, M.B. MIL-
LER, The Posteromedial Region of the Default Mode 
Network Shows Attenuated Task-Induced Deacti-
vation in Psychopathic Prisoners, in: «Neuropsy-
chology», in press (doi 10.1037/neu0000118). 
56 Ibidem. 
57 See Y. MORIGUCHI, J. DECETY, T. OHNISHI, M. 
MAEDA, T. MORI, K. NEMOTO, H. MATSUDA, G. 
KOMAKI, Empathy and Judging Other’s Pain: An 
fMRI Study of Alexithymia, in: «Cerebral 
Cortex», vol. XVII, n. 9, 2007, pp. 2223-2234. 
58 See H. KUGEL, M. EICHMANN, U. DANNLOWSKI, 
P. OHRMANN, J. BAUER, V. AROLT, W. HEINDEL, 
T. SUSLOW, Alexithymic Features and Automatic 
Amygdala Reactivity to Facial Emotion, in: «Neu-
roscience Letters», vol. CDXXXV, n. 1, 2008, pp. 
40-44. 
59 See S. IDRING, M. LUNDBERG, H. STURM, C. 
DALMAN, C. GUMPERT, D. RAI, B.K. LEE, C. 
MAGNUSSON, Changes in Prevalence of Autism 
Spectrum Disorders in 2001-2011: Findings from 
the Stockholm Youth Cohort, in: «Journal of Au-
tism and Developmental Disorders», on line first 
2014, doi 10.1007/s10803-014--2336-y; S. 
IDRING, D. RAI, H. DAL, C. DALMAN, H. STURM, 
E. ZANDER, B.K. LEE, E. SERLACHIUS, C. MAGNUS-
SON, Autism Spectrum Disorders in the Stockholm 
Youth Cohort: Design, Prevalence and Validity, in: 
«PLoS ONE», vol. VII, n. 7, 2012, 41280; B. 
REICHOW, C. SERVILI, M.T. YASAMY, C. BARBUI, S. 
SAXENA, Non-Specialist Psychosocial Interventions 
for Children and Adolescents with Intellectual 
Disability or Lower-Functioning Autism Spectrum 
Disorders: A Systematic Review, in: «PLoS Medi-
cine», vol. X, n. 12, 2013, 1001572.  
60 See N.J. SASSON, The Development of Face Pro-
cessing in Autism, in: «Journal of Autism and De-
velopmental Disorders», vol. XXXVI, n. 3, 2006, 
pp. 381-394. 
61 See T. NICKL-JOCKSCHAT, C. ROTTSCHY, J. 
THOMMES, F. SCHNEIDER, A.R. LAIRD, P.T. FOX, 
S.B. EICKHOFF, Neural Networks Related to Dys-
functional Face Processing in Autism Spectrum Dis-
order, in: «Brain Structure and Function», online 
first 2014; E.A. PAPAGIANNOPOULOU, K.M. 
CHITTY, D.F. HERMENS, I.B. HICKIE, J. LAGOPOU-
LOS, A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of 
Eye-tracking Studies in Children With Autism 
 
 
Spectrum Disorders, in: «Social Neuroscience», 
vol. IX, n. 6, 2014, pp. 610-632. 
62 See C. PETERSON, Theory of Mind Under-
standing and Empathic Behavior in Children With 
Autism Spectrum Disorders, in: «International 
Journal of Developmental Neuroscience», vol. 
XXXIX, 2014, pp. 16-21. 
63 Ibidem. 
64 See N. HADJIKHANI, N.R. ZÜRCHER, O. ROGIER, 
L. HIPPOLYTE, E. LEMONNIER, T. RUEST, N. 
WARD, A. LASSALLE, N. GILLBERG, E. BILLSTEDT, 
A. HELLES, C. GILLBERG, P. SOLOMON, K.M. 
PRKACHIN, C. GILLBERG, Emotional Contagion for 
Pain is Intact in Autism Spectrum Disorders, in: 
«Translational Psychiatry», vol. XIV, n. 4, 2014, 
art. n. e343; Y.-T. FAN, C. CHEN, S.-C. CHEN, J. 
DECETY, Y. CHENG, Empathic Arousal and Social 
Understanding in Individuals With Autism: Evi-
dence From fMRI and ERP Measurements, in: 
«Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience», 
vol. IX, n. 8, 2014, pp. 1203-1213; K. SCHNEIDER, 
K.D. PAULY, A. GOSSEN, L. MEVISSEN, T.M. MI-
CHEL, R.C. GUR, F. SCHNEIDER, U. HABEL, Neural 
Correlates of Moral Reasoning in Autism Spectrum 
Disorder, in: «Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience», vol. VIII, n. 6, 2013, pp. 702-710; 
M. SCHULTE-RÜTHER, E. GREIMEL, H.J. MARKO-
WITSCH, I. KAMP-BECKER, H. REMSCHMIDT, G.R. 
FINK, M. PIEFKE, Dysfunctions in Brain Networks 
Supporting Empathy: An fMRI Study in Adults 
With Autism Spectrum Disorders, in: «Social Neu-
roscience», vol. VI, n. 1, 2011, pp. 1-21; J.H.G. 
WILLIAMS, G.D. WAITER, A. GILCHRIST, D.I. PER-
RETT, A.D. MURRAY, A. WHITEN, Neural Mecha-
nisms of Imitation and “Mirror Neuron” Function-
ing in Autistic Spectrum Disorder, in: «Neuropsy-
chologia», vol. XLIV, n. 4, 2006, pp. 610-621; 
J.H.G. WILLIAMS, Self-other Relations in Social 
Development and Autism: Multiple Roles for Mir-
ror Neurons and Other Brain Bases, in: «Autism 
Research», vol. I, n. 2, 2008, pp. 73-90; I. 
FISHMAN, C.L. KEOWN, A.J. LINCOLN, J.A. PI-
NEDA, R.-A. MÜLLER, Atypical Cross Talk Between 
Mentalizing and Mirror Neuron Networks in Au-
tism Spectrum Disorder, in: «JAMA Psychiatry», 
vol. LXXI, n. 7, 2014, pp. 751-760. 
65 See N. HADJIKHANI, N.R. ZÜRCHER, O. ROGIER, 
L. HIPPOLYTE, E. LEMONNIER, T. RUEST, N. 
WARD, A. LASSALLE, N. GILLBERG, E. BILLSTEDT, 
A. HELLES, C. GILLBERG, P. SOLOMON, K.M. 
PRKACHIN, C. GILLBERG, Emotional Contagion for 
Pain is Intact in Autism Spectrum Disorders, cit. 
 




66 See Y.-T. FAN, C. CHEN, S.-C. CHEN, J. DECETY, 
Y. CHENG, Empathic Arousal and Social Under-
standing in Individuals With Autism, cit. 
67 See K. SCHNEIDER, K.D. PAULY, A. GOSSEN, L. 
MEVISSEN, T.M. MICHEL, R.C. GUR, F. SCHNEI-
DER, U. HABEL, Neural Correlates of Moral Reason-
ing in Autism Spectrum Disorder, cit. 
68 See M. SCHULTE-RÜTHER, E. GREIMEL, H. J. 
MARKOWITSCH, I. KAMP-BECKER, H. REM-
SCHMIDT, G.R. FINK, M. PIEFKE, Dysfunctions in 
Brain Networks Supporting Empathy, cit. 
69 See J.H.G. WILLIAMS, G.D. WAITER, A. 
GILCHRIST, D.I. PERRETT, A.D. MURRAY, A. 
WHITEN, Neural Mechanisms of Imitation and 
“Mirror Neuron” Functioning in Autistic Spectrum 
Disorder, cit. 
70 See J.H.G. WILLIAMS, Self-other Relations in 
Social Development and Autism, cit. 
71 See P.G. ENTICOTT, H.A. KENNEDY, N.J. RI-
NEHART, J.L. BRADSHAW, B.J. TONGE, Z.J. DASKA-
LAKIS, P.B. FITZGERALD, Interpersonal Motor Re-
sonance in Autism Spectrum Disorder: Evidence 
Against a Global “Mirror System” Deficit, in: 
«Frontiers in Human Neuroscience», vol. VII, 
2013, art. n. 218; A.F. DE C. HAMILTON, Reflecting 
on the Mirror Neuron System in Autism: A Syste-
matic Review of Current Theories, in: «Develop-
mental Cognitive Neuroscience», vol. III, n. 1, 
2013, pp. 91-105. 
72 See P.F. FERRARI, The Neuroscience of Social Re-
lations, cit. 
73 See I. FISHMAN, C.L. KEOWN, A.J. LINCOLN, J.A. 
PINEDA, R.-A. MÜLLER, Atypical Cross Talk 
Between Mentalizing and Mirror Neuron Networks 
in Autism Spectrum Disorder, cit. 
74 Ibidem. 
75 See M.E. RAICHLE, A.Z. SNYDER, A Default Mo-
de of Brain Function: A Brief History of an Evolving 
Idea, in: «NeuroImage», vol. XXXVII, n. 4, 
2007, pp. 1083-1090; discussion 1097-1099. 
76 See A.M. WINK, F. BERNARD, R. SALVADOR, E. 
BULLMORE, J. SUCKLING, Age and Cholinergic 
Effects on Hemodynamics and Functional Cohe-
rence of Human Hippocampus, in: «Neurobiology 
of Aging», vol. XXVII, n. 10, 2006, pp. 1395-
1404. 
77 See M.-C. LAI, M.V. LOMBARDO, B. 
CHAKRABARTI, S.A. SADEK, G. PASCO, S.J. 
WHEELWRIGHT, E.T. BULLMORE, S. BARON-
COHEN, J. SUCKLING, A Shift to Randomness of 
Brain Oscillations in People With Autism, in: 
«Biological Psychiatry», vol. LXVIII; n. 12, 2010, 
 
 
pp. 1092-1099; M.O. SOKUNBI, V.B. GRADIN, 
G.D. WAITER, G.G. CAMERON, T. S. AHEARN, 
A.D. MURRAY, D.J. STEELE, R.T. STAFF, Nonlinear 
Complexity Analysis of Brain FMRI Signals in 
Schizophrenia, in: «PloS ONE», vol. IX, n. 5, 
2014, art. n. e95146. 
78 See A.C. CHEN, A. ETKIN, Hippocampal Net-
work Connectivity and Activation Differentiates 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder From Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder, in: «Neuropsychopharmacolo-
gy», vol. XXXVIII; n. 10, 2013, pp. 1889-1898; T. 
HAHN, T. DRESLER, A.-C. EHLIS, M. PYKA, A.C. 
DIELER,  C.  SAATHOFF,  P.M.  JAKOB,  K.-P. LESCH, 
A.J. FALLGATTER, Randomness of Resting-state 
Brain Oscillations Encodes Gray’s Personality 
Trait, in: «NeuroImage», vol. LIX, n. 2, 2012, 
pp. 1842-1845; X. LEI, Z. ZHAO, H. CHEN, Extra-
version is Encoded by Scale-Free Dynamics of 
Default Mode Network, in: «NeuroImage», vol. 
LXXIV, 2013, pp. 52-57. 
79 See I. CRISTEA, C. GENTILI, C. COSTESCU, E. RIC-
CIARDI, D. DANIEL, P. PIETRINI, Neurobiological Cor-
relates of the Attitude Toward Human Empathy, un-
published manuscript, Annual Meeting of Italian 
Society of Neuroethics, Padua 2014, May 14th . 
80 See W. LI, X. MAI, C. LIU, The Default Mode 
Network and Social Understanding of Others: 
What do Brain Connectivity Studies Tell Us, in: 
«Frontiers in Human Neuroscience», vol. VIII, 
2014, art. n. 74. 
81 Ibidem. 
82 See J.P. MITCHELL, Mentalizing and Marr: An 
Information Processing Approach to the Study of 
Social Cognition, in: «Brain Research», n. 1079, 
2006, pp. 66-75. 
83 See B.K. BRENT, L.J. SEIDMAN, H.W. THERME-
NOS, D.J. HOLT, M.S. KESHAVAN, Self-
disturbances as a Possible Premorbid Indicator of 
Schizophrenia Risk: A Neurodevelopmental Per-
spective, in: «Schizophrenia Research», vol. CLII, 
n. 1, 2014, pp. 73-80; S.M. ARNFRED, A. RABALLO, 
M. MORUP, J. PARNAS, Self-Disorder and Brain 
Processing of Proprioception in Schizophrenia Spect-
rum Patients: A Re-Analysis, in: «Psychopatholo-
gy», online first 2014; J. PARNAS, P. HANDEST, D. 
SAEBYE, L. JANSSON, Anomalies of Subjective Expe-
rience in Schizophrenia and Psychotic Bipolar Ill-
ness, in: «Acta Psychiatrica Scandinava», vol. 
CVIII, n. 2, 2003, pp. 126-133. 
84 See C. LAMM, J. DECETY, T. SINGER, Meta-
analytic Evidence for Common and Distinct Neural 
Networks Associated With Directly Experienced 
 




Pain and Empathy for Pain, cit. 
85 See N. EMBRIACO, L. PAPAZIAN, N. KENTISH-
BARNES, F. POCHARD, E. AZOULAY, Burnout Syn-



















































in: «Current Opinion in Critical Care», vol. XIII, 
n. 5, 2007, pp. 482-488. 
86 See M. DAVIS, Measuring Individual Differences 
in Empathy, cit. 
